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ON EMAD ATIQ’S INCLUSIVE ANTI-POSITIVISM
Kara Woodbury-Smith
here are well-known instances of morally abhorrent law, like the legal 
rules of Nazi Germany or apartheid South Africa. According to Emad Atiq, 
the existence of morally abhorrent legal rules presents an extensional chal-
lenge to legal anti-positivism.1 Atiq acknowledges that morally abhorrent legal 
rules are intuitively legally valid, and yet anti-positivism (which maintains that 
the legal validity of a rule is partly grounded in that rule’s moral merit) cannot 
explain why. In his paper, “There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal An-
ti-positivism,” Atiq puts forward a type of anti-positivism capable of responding 
to this specific extensional challenge. He calls it Inclusive Anti-positivism (IAP).
IAP “identifies the property of being law with the . . . normative property of 
rules (being normatively well supported to a high enough degree).”2 Atiq’s reasoning 
goes like this: we can identify legal rules wherever the subjects of those rules 
have “broadly normative reasons” to follow them.3 These broadly normative 
reasons are grounded in irreducible moral facts and, as such, the legal validity of 
rules is partly grounded in the existence of moral facts that are not dependent 
on social facts. Because IAP grounds legal validity in a less restrictive conception 
of moral facts (we are no longer concerned with the moral merit of the rule in 
question when determining its legal validity, but whether it is essentially good 
to follow), IAP is able to account for the legality of morally abhorrent rules while 
preserving morality as an existence condition of law.
In section I, I point out that IAP presupposes a conceptually necessary con-
nection between law and coercion. In section II, I briefly discuss internal- and 
external-to-practice appraisals of legal rules. Last, in section III, I touch upon the 
explanations of legal normativity offered by IAP and some positivists. The point 
of this response is not to deny Atiq’s claim that there can be moral reasons to 
comply with morally abhorrent law. Rather, its aim is to raise a question: Is IAP’s 
1 Atiq, “There Are No Easy Counterexamples to Legal Anti-positivism,” 3 (hereafter cited as 
“Counterexamples”).
2 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 16.
3 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 13.
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central claim about legal validity necessarily at odds with positivism’s central 
claims that law is fundamentally a social institution and that what counts as law 
ultimately depends on social sources?4
I
Rules are normative. This means that they are action guiding—they serve as rea-
sons for action and as a means to appraise the conduct of others. Take netball: if 
you want to play netball, then you have reason to comply with the rules of netball. 
If you do not follow the rules, then others can say that you are playing netball 
incorrectly and not pick you for their team. The law is taken to be normative be-
cause, within a given territory, legal rules typically tell law subjects what they must 
refrain from doing and how to do things legally (e.g., how to enter into a contract).
Unlike the rules of netball, law’s normativity is taken to be unconditional. 
Law does not say: if you want to be law abiding, then you should not A. Rather, 
it says to everyone within its jurisdiction, regardless of whether they accept the 
law as an authority, “Do not A.” This “conditionality” of rules leads to a distinc-
tion: that there are two basic senses of normativity.5 That my daughter, who can-
not swim, will drown if she goes into a pool alone is an objective reason for her to 
comply with my rule, “Do not go swimming alone.” This means that her inability 
to swim is a reason to “not swim alone” that exists even if she thinks that the wa-
ter is shallow or that she is secretly a mermaid. On the other hand, her belief that 
she is secretly a mermaid is also a reason for action, but in the subjective sense. 
Despite what objectively may be the case (she cannot swim), she thinks she has 
reason to go swimming alone (she is secretly a mermaid).
Atiq’s General Grounding Claim (GGC) for legal validity asserts: “the rule’s 
legality is grounded in whatever normative reasons there are for agents to follow 
the rule.”6 So, per IAP, a rule can only be legally valid if there is an objective reason 
for complying with it. According to Atiq, we have objective reasons for comply-
ing with a rule whenever the rule in question surpasses a normative threshold 
that makes it worthy of adoption into the legal system by relevant officials.7 The 
normative threshold that marks the difference between legally valid and not le-
gally valid can be surpassed in three situations: (1) if a rule is of a certain moral 
4 Sometimes this claim is known as the “Social Thesis” or “Social Fact Thesis.” See Himma, 
“Philosophy of Law”; and Woodbury-Smith, “Inclusive Legal Positivism.”
5 For a classic discussion of the two senses in which rules apply, see Foot, “Morality as a Sys-
tem of Hypothetical Imperatives.”
6 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 16.
7 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 20–22.
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standard; (2) if a rule is an entrenched social convention; or (3) if a rule is a 
blend of the two.8 This means there can be rules whose legal validity is rooted in 
their moral merit, even if they are not conventionally followed. Likewise, there 
can be rules whose legal validity is grounded in their existence as entrenched 
social conventions, even if they are morally abhorrent.
IAP, therefore, shifts the focus of anti-positivism away from considerations of 
a rule’s moral merit (the focus of classic anti-positivism) and toward the objec-
tive reasons we, as subjects, have for complying with rules, including the mor-
ally abhorrent ones. Critically for Atiq, such reasons are always moral. Much of 
his article is devoted to supporting the assertion that weakly moral reasons for 
action exist, and that self-protection is a weakly moral reason for action.9 So, if 
there are weakly moral reasons like self-protection to comply with a morally ab-
horrent law, then that law can satisfy the GGC for legal validity and IAP is coun-
terexample proof.
Let us grant Atiq’s GGC, that what makes a morally abhorrent rule legally val-
id is that it is socially entrenched to such a degree that its subjects have objective 
moral reason(s) to comply with it. Is it the case that this conception of legal 
validity is actually anti-positivist in that it is not ultimately grounded in social 
facts? The answer here must be no.
Consider Nazi Germany. According to Atiq, while there were overwhelming-
ly strong moral reasons for its subjects to reject and subvert Nazi Germany’s laws, 
there was also at least one weakly moral reason to comply with them: the good 
of self-protection.10 Because of this weakly moral reason to comply with Nazi 
law, Nazi law was “good to follow to some degree.”11
What does it take for Nazi law to be “good to follow to some degree”? Ac-
cording to Atiq, it is when “deviating from conventionally embraced rules ren-
ders individuals vulnerable to sanction.”12 He later writes that the “moral reason 
to follow a conventionally embraced rule might be partly grounded in nonmoral 
facts, like the rule’s conventionality. But it is also grounded in a pure moral fact: 
the moral principle that if following a rule promotes your interests, then there is 
some moral reason to follow it.”13
Here I want to point out that there can be a difference between complying 
8 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 15–16. Throughout the discussion, when I refer to morality I am 
invoking a sense of ideal morality.
9 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 6–8.
10 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 6–8.
11 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 9.
12 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 6.
13 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 13, emphasis added.
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with a law for self-protection (e.g., behaving legally because otherwise one would 
be liable to sanction) and complying with a law for the promotion of one’s inter-
ests. Consider a law (valid in accordance with its sources) requiring that I throw 
rocks at unwed mothers. Further consider that this law is conventionally prac-
ticed. In the absence of institutionalized sanctions, not complying with this law 
would, at worst, decrease foot traffic to my business and suppress my interest in 
having lots of money. Now others who prioritize having lots of money above 
their neighbor’s health may disagree, but it is hard to see how I could have even 
a weakly moral reason to comply with that law when the worst I would face for 
refusing to cast stones upon certain persons is a reduction in my wealth.
However, if the legal system backed this law with serious sanctions and my 
noncompliance meant that the state would seize my business and detain my hus-
band, my children, and myself in labor camps, then it seems like I could have a 
weakly moral reason to comply with the law, as such compliance is about pro-
moting my interests in survival and protecting my family. Indeed, this was how 
Nazis were able to create Jewish police collaborators in their ghettos: by appeal-
ing to our innate drive to protect ourselves and our families.
Atiq’s metaethical theorizing may check out. Self-protection may be an ob-
jective, weakly moral reason for complying with morally abhorrent rules. How-
ever, it seems to lead IAP into a conundrum. Following IAP, one can only appeal 
to self-protection as a moral reason for complying with morally abhorrent rules 
if certain nonmoral social facts obtain, like institutionalized sanctions. If that 
is correct, then the legal validity of morally abhorrent rules, per IAP, ultimately 
hangs on contingent social facts—specifically, whether the legal system backs 
such rules with serious sanctions. Atiq has, it seems, developed an anti-positivist 
command theory of law. Atiq may wonder how significant this observation is, 
given there are not, at least to my knowledge, any instances of morally abhorrent 
law that are not backed by sanctions. However, if IAP is meant to include a con-
cept of legal validity in general (like positivism does), then it is an observation 
that needs consideration.
II
Atiq writes: “If inclusive anti-positivism . . . is true, it remains possible for a judge 
to comply with her legal duties while striking down morally abhorrent laws for 
conflict with other laws that are morally optimal even if weakly conventional.”14 
As an example, Atiq discusses the moral rule requiring respect for human dig-
nity. Such a rule has “enough morally going for it” that it meets the normative 
14 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 22.
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threshold for legal validity in Nazi Germany.15 Atiq goes on to write: “Had [a 
rule requiring respect for human dignity] been recognized as law by Nazi jurists, 
there might have been greater official resistance against the Third Reich.”16
The idea here is that any of the Nazi jurists could have criticized Nazi law for 
being inconsistent with the rule requiring respect for human dignity for all (which, 
per IAP, is legally valid because it is of a certain moral standard) and still be com-
plying with their legal duty to interpret and apply the law.17 However, none of 
them did and the IAP claim that there was a legally valid rule requiring respect for 
human dignity for all in Nazi Germany strikes me as being at odds with the same 
intuitions Atiq relies upon when he appeals to the legal validity of morally abhor-
rent rules. Atiq writes that denying that the Nazis had law is counterintuitive.18 
How is it not similarly counterintuitive to claim that Nazis had a legal rule requir-
ing respect for human dignity for all? The moral rule requiring respect for human 
dignity was not a legally valid rule in Nazi Germany for the simple reason that it 
was never recognized as such by any relevant legal official, despite its moral worth.
Incorporating the feature being morally good to follow as a conceptually neces-
sary feature of law is sold as a benefit because it allows for an “internal-to-prac-
tice moral critique of a legal system” such that all moral critique of law is legal 
critique.19 IAP can better track what Atiq calls the “judicial intuitions about the 
legality of rules” because it supports the following legal reasoning: “posited law 
x was never actually legally valid (or, is now invalidated) because it contravenes 
non-posited law y” (where y meets the normative threshold for legal validity un-
der IAP on the basis of its moral worth).20 Inclusive positivists, Atiq acknowl-
edges, have the ability to draw on constitutional standards and engage inter-
nal-to-practice moral critiques of law. The problem, for Atiq, is that this ability 
is contingent on social facts.21 However, this observation is not entirely correct, 
as positivists, inclusive and exclusive, can engage in internal-to-practice moral 
appraisal of law because drawing on rule-of-law principles is always a live option.
I wonder what, exactly, the benefit is of a conception of law that concludes 
15 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 21.
16 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 22.
17 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 16.
18 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 3.
19 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 22.
20 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 18.
21 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 22. If this is problematic, then it should also be problematic for 
Atiq that IAP’s ability to account for the legal validity of morally abhorrent rules is similarly 
contingent on social facts.
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that all moral critique of law is legal critique?22 The “familiar rhetoric of the judi-
cial process” may be such that when some judges morally critique the law, they 
take it to be a legal critique.23 However, I see no practical difference between the 
following decisions: (1) “Legal rule x should be struck down because it contra-
venes moral rule y” or (2) “Legal rule x should be struck down because it con-
travenes legal rule y” (where y’s legality is entirely a function of its being moral 
principle y). In either case, if the relevant officials buy the arguments about x, 
and their legal authority grants them the relevant powers, then x will be struck 
down. Decision 2 may allow judges to say to themselves that they engaged solely 
in a legal critique of the law, but that is smoke and mirrors.
One of the most interesting parts in The Concept of Law comes in the penul-
timate chapter, where H. L. A. Hart writes:
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear sighted in con-
fronting the official abuse of power, is that they should preserve the sense 
that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the 
question of obedience, and that, however great the aura of majesty or au-
thority which the official system may have, its demands must in the end 
be submitted to a moral scrutiny.24
Hart is speaking to the power that can come from the separability of moral merit 
from legal validity. Our laws are always capable of being morally scrutinized, ex-
ternally to legal practice, not only by our officials, but also by us—and this is a 
good thing.
III
Another area where Atiq sees a key explanatory difference between IAP and posi-
tivism is in their explanations of law’s normativity. Atiq writes that “no positivist, 
as far as I can tell, construes the property of legality as essentially identical to a 
bona fide normative property.”25 He is correct: positivists do not typically make 
strong assertions as to whether a legal rule is objectively normative in virtue of 
its legal validity and this is simply because positivists do not have to.
22 Atiq claims that “one of the principal motivations for being an anti-positivist is the possibil-
ity of a moral critique and improvement of law from an internal-to-law perspective” (“Coun-
terexamples,” 21).
23 Hart, The Concept of Law, 274.
24 Hart, The Concept of Law, 210.
25 Atiq, “Counterexamples,” 17. For an example of a positivist doing just this, see Himma, “A 
Comprehensive Hartian Theory of Legal Obligation” and Coercion and the Nature of Law.
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Here is one way a positivist could explain the normative property of a legal 
rule: the traditional Razian assertion is that legal rules claim to provide us with 
objective reasons for action.26 This means that there can be instances in which 
legal rules fail to provide us with such reasons. Put far too simply: in the Razian 
scheme, legal rules claim to be first- and second-order exclusionary reasons for 
action.27 Imagine that you want to y because y is fun. Act y is morally inert and is 
legal where you live, but you are currently on vacation in another country, where, 
you discover, there is a law prohibiting y. That legal prohibition claims to give 
you a first-order reason not to y. This means it claims to be a reason in itself: you 
should not y because the law you are currently subject to prohibits it. The legal 
prohibition also claims to be a second-order exclusionary reason for action. This 
means that, because you are subject to a law prohibiting y, you should not act in 
accordance with other reasons you have to y, like the prudential reason “y is fun.”
There is a sense of the term “obligation” according to which to be under a 
legal obligation simply means that one is subject to a mandatory rule—a rule 
that claims to impose an obligation. This is the sense we can have in mind with 
regard to the legal rule in apartheid South Africa that prohibited Black and white 
persons from associating with one another on beaches. Because of that legal rule, 
there was a legal obligation not to associate. And yet the moral repugnance of 
that legal rule and the ideology it sustained entailed that it actually provided no 
objective reason for action, save the avoidance of sanctions. So, despite what 
some legal rules may claim (that they are first- and second-order reasons for ac-
tion), it is possible for them to fail to actually provide such reasons for action.
What does this have to do with IAP? As stated, IAP asserts that legal validity of 
a rule is identical to the rule’s property of being actually normative—of actually 
providing objective reasons for action. Where morally abhorrent legal rules are 
concerned, their normative property comes down to socially contingent con-
siderations raised in section I: whether such rules are backed by sanctions. So, 
per IAP, in apartheid South Africa the desire to avoid sanctions gave white and 
Black persons objective reason to comply with its morally abhorrent legal rules. 
What I hope I have made clear in this section is that this is the same explanation 
of legal normativity offered by the Razian sketch above: even if a legal rule does 
not itself give its subjects objective reasons to comply with its directives, the 
legal system may give other reasons for compliance by, for instance, threatening 
the use of sanctions.
The only relevant difference between IAP and the Razian picture is the con-
nection between legal validity and the normative property of legal rules. For 
26 Raz, The Authority of Law, 30.
27 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, esp. 35–48, 58–59.
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those who accept the Razian picture, inquiries into legal validity are distinct 
from inquiries into the reasons we have for complying with legal rules. Atiq may 
be generally correct when he notes that positivists do not typically construe le-
gal validity as identical to its objective normative property, but that is simply be-
cause positivists can explain the legal validity of a rule without needing to draw 
such an identity claim. To connect this point back to the passage by Hart at the 
end of section II, there are very good reasons for preferring such a conception 
of law.
IV
With IAP, Atiq has shifted the moral fact of interest away from the moral merit 
of a legal rule and toward the rule’s property of being good to follow. This is how 
IAP is able to account for the legal validity of morally abhorrent rules. In this 
discussion I raise three observations. First, our ability to appeal to weakly moral 
reasons to comply with morally abhorrent law is contingent on social facts (e.g., 
that the law is backed by sanctions).28 Second, the upshot to IAP that all moral 
appraisal of legal rules is legal appraisal is not necessarily as appealing as Atiq 
takes it to be. Last, the Razian thesis that law claims to provide its subjects with 
objective reasons for action is not necessarily at odds with the picture of legal 
normativity that Atiq draws.
Of the three observations, I think the first presents the most trouble for IAP. 
Positivists argue that law is a social institution and that what counts as valid law 
ultimately depends on social sources. As I observed in section I, following IAP, 
unless the state gives its subjects weakly moral reasons to comply with its rules 
(by institutionalizing sanctions), then those rules, should any of them be mor-
ally abhorrent, would fail to be legally valid. Given this essential connection be-
tween the contingent social fact of sanctions and legal validity, IAP seems to be 




28 Atiq could perhaps make the claim that obedience to morally abhorrent law is morally re-
quired for the common good, which is Aquinas’s view (though Aquinas, of course, main-
tains that morally abhorrent human laws are not genuine instances of law). See Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, q.96, a.4.
29 I am indebted to Emad Atiq who wrote an article that I thoroughly enjoyed spending time 
with (no small thing as this was written during the first lockdown of the COVID-19 pandem-
ic). My thanks as well to the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and supportive com-
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